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Models of repeated legislative bargaining typically assume an agenda setter is randomly
selected each period, even if the previous period agenda setter successfully passed a proposal.
In reality, successful legislative agenda setters (e.g., speakers, committee chairs) tend to hold
onto power. We propose two alternative models in which successful agenda setters retain power.
In the rst model, a successful agenda setter automatically keeps power. Such an assumption is
easy to work with and results in a policy equal to that in a traditional non-repeated game. In
the second model, an agenda setter requires the support of a legislative majority to retain power.
Such an assumption is realistic and results in the most-equitable policy outcome. Compared
to both of these models, the standard random-selection model exaggerates the agenda setter's
ability to extract rent from the legislative process, and underestimates the wellbeing of the
legislative majority. (JEL: D72, D78. Keywords: repeated legislative bargaining, stationary
equilibrium, agenda control, proposal power)
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11 Introduction
In their inuential paper, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) adapt a Rubinstein (1982) bargaining frame-
work for legislative decision making. A random legislator is appointed as the agenda setter to
propose a division of a given budget. The other legislators then vote on the proposed budget. If a
majority of legislators vote in favor of the proposal, it passes and the game ends. Otherwise, a new
legislator is randomly selected to make a new proposal and the process repeats. Our article presents
a framework in which legislators repeatedly engage in a Baron-Ferejohn legislative bargaining game.
When a proposal passes in our framework, the game does not end; rather, the legislature begins
work on the next budget allocation. Within each round of bargaining{from the period following the
passage of one proposal through the period in which the next proposal passes{the game is identical
to the closed-rule bargaining game in Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
This is not the rst article to model legislative bargaining in a repeated environment. A grow-
ing literature applies such a framework to analyze how policy evolves over time (e.g. Baron 1996,
Kalandrakis 2004, 2009, Baron and Herron 2003, Battaglini and Coate 2007, 2008, Duggan and
Kalandrakis 2010). In focusing on how the status quo changes over time, the articles make simpli-
fying assumptions regarding the transition of agenda setting power from one round of bargaining
to the next. With few exceptions, the literature assumes that a new legislator is randomly selected
to serve as agenda setter each period, independent of past success. Even a successful agenda setter
with the support of most other legislators is unable to hold onto power. Frequent turnover of
agenda setting power is built into the models. Such an assumption is inconsistent with the fact
that agenda setting authority in the US Congress rarely changes hands. Since the rst US Congress
in 1789, for example, there have been only 59 changes in the Speaker of the House. No more than
24 of these changes can be attributed to the speaker losing support amongst his party.1 Committee
chairmanships show similar consistency. In the US Senate, for example, there have been 26 dierent
chairmen of the appropriations committee since its establishment in 1867.2 The average Speaker
of the House held the position for 4.3 years, and the average appropriations committee chairman
held the position for 5.5 years.
We propose two alternative assumptions about if and how a successful agenda setter can hold
onto power. The models involve endogenous proposal power in that an agenda setter's ability to
stay in power may depend on her current-period proposal. The simplest of the two frameworks
assumes that an agenda setter who successfully passes a proposal in period t automatically serves
as the agenda setter again in period t+1. The model has a number of attractive features. First, it
1Of the changes, 28 corresponded to a change in the House majority party, four were due to the death of the sitting
speaker, one was due to Schuyler Colfax stepping down to become vice president, and two were due to Henry Clay
temporarily stepping down to dabble in international relations. Our estimate of 24 speakers who may have lost the
support of their party as including the 23 changes in speaker that took place between sessions of congress in which
the same party maintained power, and when James Wright steppend down mid-congress amid an ethics scandal.
2Similarly, there have been eight dierent chairmen of the budget committee since it was established in 1975, and
19 dierent chairmen of the banking committee since its establishment in 1913 (either the Committee on Banking
and Currency that existed from 1913 to 1970 or the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Aairs that has
been in place since 1970).
2is no more complicated to work with than the standard random-agenda setter assumption. Second,
consistent with the realities of the legislative process, the model predicts low turnover of agenda
setter power in equilibrium. Third, compared to the random-agenda setter assumption, the model
gives less bargaining power to the agenda setter and more to the legislative majority. This means
that the model results in less extreem predictions about the ability of the agenda setter to ex-
tract rent from the legislative process, and less pessimistic predictions about the wellbeing of the
legislative majority. Interestingly, the model results in a per-period allocation that is identical
to the one-time allocation in the non-repeated Baron and Ferejohn game. This suggests that the
non-repeated legislative bargaining game, and the results that come out of such models, may not
unravel when we allow for repeated interactions. In fact, depending on the specics of the repeated
process, the predictions of the repeated and non-repeated models may be identical.
The second framework we propose involves the legislature rst voting on a proposal, then vot-
ing on whether to keep or replace the agenda setter. In order to keep power, the agenda setter
must maintain the support of a majority of other legislators. Passing a proposal is not enough to
stay in power. This model is the most realistic framework that we consider; it is also the most
complicated. If legislators do not care enough about future periods, then the equilibrium resembles
the equilibrium under the random-agenda setter assumption. That is, the agenda setter maximizes
her current period rent extraction without concern for staying in power. The more interesting equi-
librium exists when legislators care enough about future periods (a standard assumption through
much of the literature). In this case, the agenda setter shares a large enough portion of the budget
with other legislators in order to maintain their support, and hold onto power. Compared to the
standard model, the agenda setter has even less bargaining power in this framework, and is able to
extract even less rent from the legislative process. The legislative majority does not have to give
up an entire period's allocation in order to remove the agenda setter from power if she does not
keep them happy, and because of this the agenda setter must give a larger share of the budget to
the legislative majority in order to maintain power.
The results from the models, taken together, show that assumptions about how agenda setting
power caries over from one period to the next matter. The results provide insights into how
to incorporate the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining framework into a repeated
environment. The most common assumption, that agenda setting power is randomly determined
in each period, is not only the least realistic of the models, it exaggerates agenda setting power and
produces the most pessimistic results about the wellbeing of the legislative majority. Assuming
instead that a successful agenda setter automatically holds onto power keeps the framework just
as tractable, but produces more attractive results from both a positive and normative perspective.
That is, the model results in low turnover of agenda setter power, and predicts a more equitable
division of the budget between the agenda setter and the legislative majority. What's more, we show
that this model predicts the same equilibrium allocation in each period as the one-time equilibrium
allocation in the non-repeated game. Alternatively assuming that an agenda setter must maintain
the support of a legislative majority is the most realistic framework, and when legislators care
3enough about future periods, it predicts low turnover of agenda setter power and produces the
most attractive results about the wellbeing of the legislative majority.
Given the results, we see little reason to rely on the standard assumption that a new agenda
setter is randomly selected each period when incorporating legislative bargaining into a repeated
environment. Assuming that agenda setting power is exogenously determined by a random process
(independent of whether the agenda setter successfully passes a proposal or has the support of the
legislative majority) is both unrealistic and produces pessimistic results. Either of the alternative
models has its attractive features. Our rst model is easy to use and predicts a similar outcome
as a non-repeated game. Our second model is more complicated, but is also the most realistic.
Since the second model predicts a more equitable division of the budget, the results from the rst
model{as well as the non-repeated game{may be seen as an upper bound for agenda setter rent
extraction, and a lower bound for the share of the budget allocated to the legislative majority.
2 Literature
Romer and Rosenthal (1978) develop a model of legislative decision making in which a legislature
must choose a budget. An agenda setter (henceforth \AS" or "she") rst proposes a budget; then
the entire legislature votes on whether to implement the proposal or keep the status quo in place. In
equilibrium, the AS proposes a budget that maximizes her own district's net transfer, while giving
the legislative majority just enough pork barrel transfers to make it indierent between voting in
favor of or against the proposal. The AS's monopoly over proposal power can result in her being
the only legislator that is made better o by new legislation. Other legislators are at best indierent
between the new budget and the status quo.
Baron and Ferejohn (1989)'s legislative bargaining model essentially incorporates a Rubinstein
(1982) bargaining game into the Romer-Rosenthal model. The primary dierence between the
Baron-Ferejohn and Romer-Rosenthal frameworks is that in the Baron-Ferejohn model, the game
does not end when a proposal fails to gain majority support. Rather, a new legislator may be
selected to propose a new budget allocation. That is, a single legislator does not have a monopoly
over proposal power in the game. If the AS fails to pass a proposal, she may be replaced with
a new AS.3 In Baron-Ferejohn, the AS's proposal gives a majority of legislators just enough to
entice them to vote in favor of the proposal. Here, however, the legislative majority requires larger
transfers of pork to support a proposal than they did in Romer and Rosenthal (1978). Although
the AS still captures the largest share of the budget compared with any other legislator, her share
is smaller than in the Romer-Rosenthal game. Furthermore, the majority of legislators are better
o compared to the status quo policy.
The current paper applies the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model in repeated games. As such,
a version of Baron and Ferejohn (1989)'s classic model is presented in Section 3 of this paper, and
serves as a non-repeated benchmark throughout the analysis.
3As in Binmore (1987)'s extension of Rubinstein bargaining, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) assumes that the AS is
determined by a stochastic process.
4Many articles extend Baron and Ferejohn (1989)'s theoretical analysis (e.g., Baron 1996, Banks
and Duggan 2000, Merlo and Wilson 1995, Banks and Duggan 2006, Eraslan 2002, Gersbach 2004,
Snyder et al. 2005, Breitmoser Forthcoming), or apply it in various settings (e.g., Merlo 1997, Chari
et al. 1997, Morelli 1999, Jackson and Moselle 2002). Our review focuses on the subset of articles
that apply legislative bargaining in a repeated setting. Baron (1996) considers a repeated applica-
tion in which the status quo any period is the previous policy that the legislature implemented. In
equilibrium, agenda setters strategically propose policies (and manipulate the status quo) in order
to limit the feasible proposals available to other agenda setters in the future. The emphasis of the
model is an endogenous status quo policy, with the default policy equal to the most-recent imple-
mented proposal. Kalandrakis (2004), Kalandrakis (2009), and Duggan and Kalandrakis (2010)
generalize Baron's results, allowing for multidimensional policy spaces.4 Battaglini and Coate
(2007, 2008) allow the legislature to choose policies that aect government spending, taxes, and
debt, considering how these variables uctuate over time. McKelvey and Riezman (1992) consider
dynamic legislative bargaining when legislators must stand for reelection after each period and the
probability of serving as the AS is increasing in one's seniority. Diermeier and Fong (2009) de-
velop an alternative model of legislative bargaining in which an agenda setter has monopoly power
over proposals, the status quo is determined by the most-recently implemented proposal, and the
legislative process repeats with positive probability.
Each of these repeated applications of legislative bargaining assume that the status quo policy
evolves over time, determined by past-period bargaining outcomes. To focus on how the status
quo evolves over time, the articles make the simplifying assumption that AS power is exogenous,
independent of past policy outcomes. This is the case when an AS is randomly selected each period
(e.g., Duggan and Kalandrakis 2010), or when the identity of future ASs is common knowledge
(e.g., Diermeier and Fong 2009). The current paper takes the opposite approach from the existing
literature, with our analysis focusing on the rules governing how AS power changes over time,
and their aect on equilibrium outcomes. To isolate the eects of our assumptions concerning AS
power, we simplify the other aspects of the problem by assuming a stable, exogenous status quo
policy. We are aware of no other article that focuses on the AS-authority aspect of the repeated
environment.
3 A Benchmark: Non-Repeated Legislative Bargaining
We begin the analysis with a standard, non-repeated legislative bargaining model. This framework
will serve as a foundation for the repeated models in Section 4.
There are n identical legislative districts, each represented by a single legislator. The n-member
legislature is responsible for splitting a budget between the n districts. The total size of the
budget equals 1. The share of the budget allocated to district i = 1;:::;n is denoted ai. Vector
a = (arand;:::;an) refers to the \allocation," where ai 2 [0;1] for all i and
Pn
i=1 ai  1.
4See also ? who develop a model of dynamic bargaining between coalitions which allows for fully transferable
utility between agents.
5At the beginning of the game, a legislator is selected to serve as the initial-period agenda setter
(henceforth \AS" or \she"). In period 1, the initial AS proposes an allocation. Then, the n 1 other
legislators simultaneously vote on the proposed allocation. If at least m of the other legislators
vote in favor of the proposal, then the budget is divided according to the proposal and the game
ends. We refer to m as the \majority" although any m 2 f1;:::;n   2g is allowed. If fewer than m
other legislators vote for the proposal, then the proposal fails, and a new AS is randomly selected
to propose another allocation. The process continues until a proposal passes, at which point the
game ends.
Legislators discount future periods at a factor  2 (0;1). If a proposal passes in period t giving
legislator i allocation ai, then i earns period-t utility of ut
i = ai, and period-1 utility u1
i = t 1ai.
Following the literature, each legislator is equally likely to be selected as the AS in any period, the
AS in each period randomly chooses which other legislators to include in a majority coalition (i.e.,
minimum winning coalition), and an indierent legislator votes in favor of a proposal.
Equilibrium
To deal with the multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria that arrise in innite period environ-
ments, the literature focuses on symmetric, subgame perfect, pure strategy, stationary Markov
perfect equilibria, referred to simply as stationary equilibria (e.g., Baron and Ferejohn 1989). We
do the same here. In a stationary equilibrium, the same strategy prole is played in every identical
subgame, and strategies cannot condition on past periods.
The AS and other legislators face the same incentives in all periods of the game. Therefore in
the stationary equilibrium, if the game does not end before some arbitrary period t, the period-t
AS makes the same proposal and the other legislators follow the same voting strategies as were
played by their counterparts in all previous periods.
To begin, it should be clear that the AS in any period will never propose an allocation that
oers a positive allocation to more than m other legislators. Furthermore, the budget constraint
will bind in equilibrium with
Pn
i=1 ai = 1. This means that the AS in any period will propose an
allocation that gives m other randomly selected legislators a positive allocation, denoted aM > 0.
She will also assign aAS = 1 maM to herself, and ai = 0 to all others that are not members of the
majority coalition. The rst period AS chooses a proposal such that it passes in the rst round.
We now determine the equilibrium levels of aM and aAS.
In any period t, a legislator votes for a proposal assigning him an allocation of at least v, where
v is his expected value from the game continuing into the next period. Therefore, aM = v, and
aAS = 1   mv. This implies that v = 1
n(1   mv) + m
n v. Solving for v gives v = 1
n.
The equilibrium solution to the non-repeated game serves as a benchmark for the rest of the
analysis. In each period of the unique stationary equilibrium, legislators vote in favor of any
proposal that oers them at least =n; and the AS proposes aAS = 1 m=n for herself, aM = =n
for m randomly selected legislators, and ai = 0 for all others. Such a proposal passes in the rst
period.
64 Repeated Legislative Bargaining
The previous section presents a standard, non-repeated Baron and Ferejohn (1989) bargaining
game. Our primary contribution comes in this section, where we compare dierent models of
repeated legislative bargaining. In each of our models, the legislature plays a repeated version of
the bargaining game from Section 3. When a proposed allocation passes, the game starts over the
next period. Our models dier in whether and how an AS can hold onto power from one round of
bargaining to the next.
If the period t proposal passes, who serves as AS in period t+1? The literature typically assumes
that a new legislator is randomly selected to serve as the AS in the next period. In addition to
considering this possibility, we propose two alternative frameworks in which a successful AS may
hold onto power. The rst possibility is that a successful AS automatically continues as the next
period AS. In this case, a sitting AS loses power only if she is unable to pass a proposal. The
second possibility is that the legislature rst votes on whether to pass a proposal, then votes on
whether to keep or replace the AS. The AS in period t continues as the AS in period t + 1 if and
only if the majority of other legislators vote on her behalf. These are models of endogenous agenda
setting authority.
We refer to each stage game{i.e., the period immediately following the passage of a proposal
through the period in which the next allocation is passed{as a \round" of bargaining. The bargain-
ing game within each round is identical to the non-repeated bargain game from Section 3. In the
period following the passage of a proposal, the bargaining process begins over, with the identity of
the initial AS in the new round dependent on the model.
In each of these models, the stage game is identical to the non-repeated game from the previous
section. The total size of the budget in each period equals 1. The share of the period t budget
allocated to district i = 1;:::;n is denoted at
i, where at = (at
rand;:::;at
n). Legislator i's period-t
utility is simply ut
i(at) = at
i. If a proposed allocation does not pass in any period, that period's
allocation assigns zero to all legislative districts. Discount factor  2 (0;1) applies to periods
within a round of bargaining, i.e., when a proposal does not pass. Discount factor  2 (0;] applies
between rounds of bargaining.
In each of the models, an AS's proposal must receive votes from m other legislators to pass. If
a legislator requires a positive allocation in order to vote for a proposal (or vote in favor of the AS
in the second endogenous model), then m other legislators will be included in a majority coalition
(i.e., minimum winning coalition) by the AS. Mt denotes the majority coalition in period t, and
at
M denotes the period-t allocation assigned to a member of Mt. The analysis makes the following
assumptions about Mt.
A 1 If a new AS is drawn at the end of period t, then each legislator serves as period t+1 AS with
probability 1
n, and is included in Mt+1 with probability m
n .5
5When the period-t AS loses power, she is just as likely to serve as the next period's AS as any other legislator.
This assumption is purely for analytical convenience, and the results will continue to hold if we assume that the AS
cannot serve as AS in the period immediately after she loses power.
7A 2 In the models with endogenous AS authority, if all members of majority coalition Mt vote in
favor of the AS in period t, then the AS includes the same subset of legislators in the next period
majority coalition Mt+1.
In any period, the AS may be indierent about which legislators to include in M; the assumptions
add structure to this choice.6 A 1 is standard for the literature. A 2 applies only in the models
where agenda setting authority is endogenous. It implicitly assumes that the AS can commit to
keeping a legislator in the majority coalition as long as he continues to vote in favor of the AS's
proposals. This increases the expected payos members of the majority coalition get from allowing
the current AS to hold onto power; they are assured of being included in the majority coalition
again the next period if they vote in her favor. We discuss alternative assumptions in Section 4.5.
Finally, we follow the literature and assume the following.
A 3 A legislator who is indierent between voting in favor of or against a proposal (or sitting AS)
will choose the alternative that he would choose if he were certain to cast the deciding vote. If he
is still indierent, he votes in favor of the proposal (or sitting AS).
This rules out equilibria in which, for example, no legislator ever votes in favor of a (potentially
benecial) proposal, and no legislator has an incentive to deviate because no single legislator can
pass a proposal on his own.
Innite period models suer from multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. To reign in the
number of equilibria, we follow the literature and look for symmetric, subgame perfect, pure-
strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibria, which we refer to simply as stationary equilibria.
The solution concept puts a number of restrictions on equilibria including symmetry and subgame
perfection. Most importantly, it allows us to restrict our attention to pure-strategy, stationary
strategies which require that a legislator plays the same strategy in every period of the game.
Combined with symmetry, this requirement means that the sitting AS makes the same proposal
and the other legislators follow the same voting rule in every period. This also implies that a pro-
posal either always passes or is always rejected. Any equilibrium found when restricting attention
to stationary strategies will also be an equilibrium if we allow for a less-restrictive strategy set
(although fewer restrictions mean other equilibria may also exist).7
Before considering the three models separately, it is helpful to establish the following lemma.
It rules out the existence of stationary equilibria in which the proposed allocation fails.
6Baron and Herron (2003) consider a nite-length repeated bargaining game in which the status quo evolves over
time but agenda setting power is exogenous. They show that even in a simple dynamic environment, the game is
\remarkably poorly-behaved due to the opportunity of agenda setters to choose among majorities." By lending some
structure to the AS's choice of a majority coalition, our assumptions alleviate many of these problems.
7Limiting the strategy set to the set of stationary strategies greatly simplies{but does not weaken{the analysis.
This approach allows us to nd all stationary equilibria, and each of the equilibria will continue to be equilibria when
a broader class of strategies are allowed (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Chapter 13). This is because a player that
wants to play a certain strategy in one period will also want to play the same strategy in all similar periods in the
future. When we consider a player's incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy, because all others are already
playing stationary strategies, the player will prefer to deviate in the same way in all periods{that is, his preferred
deviation will also be a symmetric strategy.
8Lemma 1 In all three of the repeated models, there does not exist a stationary equilibrium in which
a proposed allocation does not pass.
All proofs are provided in the appendix. We provide intuition in the body of the paper. Suppose
instead that the game was in an equilibrium in which a proposal does not pass. Then, legislators
benet from passing any proposal that provides them with a positive allocation. The AS now
has an incentive to propose a small allocation for a majority of legislators keeping the rest of the
budget for her own district, since such a proposal will pass making both the AS and the majority
of legislators better o than with their equilibrium payos of zero. Hence, a contradiction. The
lemma allows the discussion to focus on equilibria in which proposed allocations pass.
4.1 Random selection of AS
Most of the literature assumes a random selection of the agenda setter each period, independent
of past success. In each period, a legislator is randomly selected to serve as AS. After a proposal
passes, another round of bargaining starts with a new legislator randomly selected to serve as the
initial AS in the new game. Denote this random-selection game by  rand.
In each period of the stationary equilibrium, the AS proposes aM  0 for a randomly selected
set of m other legislators, aAS for herself, and ai = 0 for all other legislators. Other legislators
vote in favor of a proposal if and only if their expected lifetime utility from doing so is at least as
large as their expected lifetime utility from voting against the proposal. A legislator's benet from
voting in favor of the proposed period t allocation is strictly increasing in at
i. Therefore, if i votes
in favor of a proposal that oers him at
i, he will also vote in favor of any proposal that oers more
than at
i. This means that we can represent a non-AS legislator's voting strategy in any period by
a cut-rule  a, where he votes in favor of a proposal if and only if it oers him at least  a. Because
of the symmetric and stationary equilibrium requirements,  a must be the same for all legislators
and in all periods. Therefore, the stationary equilibrium of the game can be fully represented by a
description of aM and  a.
Proposition 2 describes the unique stationary equilibrium of game  rand. A formal derivation
is provided in the appendix.








The AS proposes a
AS = 1   m a and a
M =  a, which passes. If  = , then  a = a
M = 0 and
a
AS = 1. Given A 1, A 2, and A 3, this is the unique stationary equilibrium of the game.
Since AS power and Mt are exogenously determined, the ex ante expected per period payo
to each legislator equals 1




starting in any period, and a legislator expects a future payo of  1
n
1
1  if the current period
proposal does not pass, and a future payo of  1
n
1
1  if the current period proposal does pass. The
9benet to future utility of not passing a proposal therefore equals  a, as derived above. To entice
a legislator to vote in favor of a proposal, it must oer the majority large enough allocations to
oset the costs associated with the increased delay from passing a proposal. That is, a legislator
will vote in favor of a current period allocation that provides him with at least  a. The AS sets
aM =  a, oering just enough to oset the costs of delay.
When  = , there is no extra delay associated with passing a proposal, in which case legislators
never have an incentive to vote against a proposal. In this case,  a = 0 and the stationary
equilibrium involves the AS capturing the entire budget for her own district.
4.2 Successful AS stays in power
The rst endogenous model is similar to the random-selection model with one important exception:
if a proposal passes, the AS that made the successful proposal continues on as the AS in the initial
period of the next round of bargaining. Here, an AS holds onto power as long as she continues
proposing allocations that pass. This model is particularly interesting because, as we show below,
it results in the same per-period allocation as in the non-repeated benchmark game. Denote this
game in which a successful AS automatically retains power by  auto.
In this section, if a proposal passes in period t, then a new bargaining game begins in period
t+1 with the successful AS from the previous period serving as the initial AS in the new bargaining
game. Here again we can fully represent an equilibrium by majority-coalition allocation aM, and
voting cut rule  a. Proposition 3 describes the stationary equilibrium of the game.






The AS proposes a
AS = 1 m a and a
M =  a, which passes. Given A 1, A 2, and A 3, this is the
unique stationary equilibrium of the game.
In equilibrium, a majority member who votes in favor of the period t proposal expects to earn
aM in the current period, and in all future periods. That is, his expected lifetime utility is aM
1
1 .
Alternatively, voting against the period-t proposal results in expected per period utility of 1
n starting
in the next period, and expected lifetime utility of 
n
1
1 . Therefore, a majority member votes in
favor of the proposal each period, as long as ai   a = 
n. The AS recognizes this and proposes the
lowest acceptable allocation in each period.
4.3 Legislature votes on whether AS stays in power
In the second endogenous model, the legislature rst votes on whether to pass an allocation proposal,
and then in a separate vote decides whether to keep or replace the sitting AS. There are separate
votes on the proposal and on AS power. Here, replacing an AS does not require that the legislature
10turn down the current-period proposal. Rather, the legislature can vote in favor of a proposal, and
still vote to replace the AS.
Formally, in each period the game takes place in the following order:
1. The AS makes a proposal.
2. The other n 1 legislators vote on the proposal, which is implemented if m vote in its favor.
3. If the proposal passes, then the n   1 legislators vote whether to keep or replace the sitting
AS. If m other legislators vote in favor of the sitting AS, then she holds onto power into the
next period. If fewer than m legislators vote in favor of the AS, or if the allocation proposal
does not pass during the rst vote, then a new legislator is randomly selected to serve as AS
in the next period.
Denote this game by  vote.
If a proposed allocation does not pass, a new legislator is automatically selected to serve as
the next period's AS. Only after a proposal passes does the legislator vote on whether to keep or
replace the AS. This structure means that our three models dier only in their transition between
one round of bargaining and the next. Within each round of bargaining, the three models are
identical.8
Lemma 1 establishes that any stationary equilibria must involve the proposed allocation pass-
ing in each period. Furthermore, the solution concept requires that strategies be symmetric and
stationary, which means that the outcome of each period will be the same; either the AS always
holds onto power, or she always loses power. This means that any stationary equilibria is one of
two possible types, which we dene here. In each period of a high-turnover equilibrium, the legis-
lature rst passes the proposed allocation, then votes to replace the sitting AS. In each period of
a low-turnover equilibrium, the legislature rst passes the proposed allocation, then votes to keep
the sitting AS.
In any equilibria, legislators employ cut rules in their voting strategies. A legislator votes in favor
of a proposal that oers him a large-enough allocation, then votes to keep the AS if she passed
a proposal that provides him with a high(er)-enough allocation. A legislator requires a higher
allocation in order to vote in favor of the AS, then he does to simply vote in favor of the proposal.
In equilibrium, a legislator votes against a proposal if he is oered too small of an allocation, he
votes in favor of the proposal then against the AS if the proposal provides him with a moderate
allocation, and he votes in favor of the proposal then in support of the AS if the proposal provides
him with a high-enough allocation. This means that the AS faces a choice between maximizing
current-period payos and holding onto AS power. Her rst option is to propose an allocation that
gives a majority of legislators just enough allocation that they vote in favor of the proposal; this
maximizes her current-period rent extraction, but results in her losing power. Her second option is
to propose an allocation that provides other legislators with a larger share of the budget, enough
8It would be straightforward to assume instead that the legislature votes on the AS at the end of every period.
This will not change the equilibrium allocation, as Lemma 1 established that proposals always pass in equilibrium.
11that they will also vote to keep the AS in power; this reduces the AS's ability to extract rent in
the current period, but increases her expected payo in future periods. The AS's preferred option
depends on her discount factor. If she is suciently impatient, then the AS chooses to maximize
her current-period payos at the cost of losing power at the end of the period. If she cares enough
about future periods, then the AS is willing to share a larger portion of the budget with other
legislators in order to keep her agenda setting authority.
There exists two possible stationary equilibria; one is a high-turnover equilibrium and the other
a low-turnover equilibrium. The high-turnover equilibrium exists when legislators are suciently
impatient. The low-turnover equilibrium exists when legislators care enough about future periods.
As we show below, at least of of these equilibria always exists, and there are some parameter
values over which both exist. We walk though the formal derivation of equilibria in the appendix.
Proposition 4 describes the equilibrium in detail.
Proposition 4 In  vote,
 A high-turnover equilibrium exists i
 
(1   )m
n   1   m
.
In each period of the high-turnover equilibrium,
{ Legislators vote in favor of any proposal that oers them at least 1
n
 
1 , and vote in favor
of an AS that provided them with at least 1
n.









{ A majority of legislators vote in favor of the proposal, then vote to replace the AS.
 A low-turnover equilibrium exists i
 
(1   )m
n   1   m
.
In each period of the low-turnover equilibrium,
{ Legislators vote in favor of any proposal that oers them at least 
n, and vote in favor of
an AS that provided them with at least 1
n.
{ The AS proposes an allocation in which a
M = 1
n, and a
AS = 1   m
n .
{ A majority of legislators vote in favor of the proposal, then vote to keep the AS.
 Given A 1, A 2, and A 3, when  >
(1 )m
n 1 m, the low-turnover equilibrium is the unique station-
ary equilibrium. When  <
(1 )m
n 1 m, the high-turnover equilibrium is the unique stationary
equilibrium. Otherwise, both equilibria exist.
12When legislators care little-enough about future periods, their strategies ignore any concerns
about long-run agenda setting authority. In this case, the legislators are inuenced by the same
incentives as in the random-selection model, which results in the high-turnover here being equal to
the standard model allocation. The low-turnover allocation here resembles the allocation in  auto,
except that in this setting the AS has less bargaining power and must therefore share a larger
portion of the budget to stay in power. When legislators care enough about future periods, which
is a common assumption in application, only the low-turnover equilibrium exists. As  approaches
1, for example, the low-turnover equilibrium is the only equilibrium regardless of . As  approaches
, on the other hand, the low-turnover equilibrium is the only equilibrium as long as  > m
n 1.
4.4 Comparing the Models
Although all of the models are similar in that their equilibria involve the AS capturing a larger-
than-average share of the budget each period, and never sharing any of the budget with more than
m other legislators, there are substantial dierences between the three models. First of all, the
random-selection model is the only model in which there does there not exist the possibility an AS
holding onto power across many periods.9 The other models allow for this (realistic) possibility.
Additionally, the discount factors play a dierent role in each of the three model's equilibrium
allocation. In standard model and the high-turnover equilibrium of  vote, it is the dierence between
the two discount factors  and  that aect the allocation. In  auto, only the intra-period discount
factor, , aects the equilibrium allocation since voting against a proposal prevents the game
from proceeding into a new round of bargaining. In the low-turnover equilibrium of  vote, neither
discount factor aects the allocation since the game procedes from one round to the next each
period, regardless of whether the legislature keeps or replaces the sitting AS.
These dierences in equilibrium outcomes imply dierences in the models' predictions about
the magnitude of the per-period allocations and the long term expected utility for the various
legislators. We discuss these dierences in detail below.
Per-period allocation
In the equilibrium of the non-repeated benchmark model, the AS proposes a division of the budget
that gives a majority of other legislators a positive allocation, but keeps the largest share for herself.
The proposal passes in the rst period and the game ends. In our repeated models, the outcome in
each period looks similar to the one-time outcome of the non-repeated game. That is, a proposal
passes every period that assigns the largest share of the budget to the AS. The portion of the
budget captured by the AS, however, depends on the model.
Proposition 5 compares the per-period allocation in each of the repeated models. We use
 voteHT and  voteLT to denote  vote when it results in a high-turnover equilibrium and a low-
9We mean no systematic way for an AS to hold onto power. Technically, there is a random chance that an AS
holds onto power even when she is replaced each period, as each legislator has a 1=n chance of being selected AS in
each period that a new AS is selected.
13turnover equilibrium, respectively. Remember, when legislators care enough about future periods,












From a welfare perspective, a social planner interested in a single period's allocation may prefer
the game that results in an AS allocation closest to 1
m; it is this allocation that divides the budget
equally between all members of the majority coalition and the AS.10 Although none of the models
achieves this equitable division of the budget, the low-turnover allocation in  vote comes closest,
followed by the allocation in  auto. The random-selection model,  rand, results in the least equitable
division.
We can also compare the per-period allocations in the repeated models to the one-time allocation
in the non-repeated game from Section 3.  rand, is a straightforward generalization of the non-
repeated framework. If the legislators do not care about future rounds of bargaining (i.e.,  ! 0),
then the model produces the same results as the non-repeated benchmark in Section 3. Since
 > 0, however, the per-period allocation in  rand always results in a larger transfer to the AS and
a smaller transfer to other legislators compared with the non-repeated benchmark. This is also
true in the high-turnover equilibrium of  vote, which produces the same per period allocation as
the standard model. In the low-turnover equilibrium of  vote, on the other hand, the AS is willing
to give up enough of her potential current-period allocation to hold onto power. The AS not only
wants to pass a proposal, she also wants to maintain enough support to hold onto power. The
dynamic concerns result in the AS sharing a larger portion of the budget than she does in the
non-repeated game. The period allocation is strictly higher for the majority coalition members,
and strictly lower for the AS in the low-turnover equilibrium of  vote compared to the benchmark.
The model where a successful AS automatically retains power provides the most interesting
comparison between the per-period allocation in a repeated game and the one-time allocation in
the non-repeated game. The comparison warrants its own proposition.
Proposition 6 In the stationary equilibrium of  auto, the per-period allocation is identical to the
one time allocation in the benchmark non-repeated game.
 auto results in the same per period allocation as the non-repeated benchmark. But, where the
benchmark model produces the allocation in a game that lasts only one period in equilibrium,
the repeated model sustains the allocation in each period of a repeated framework. That is, the
allocation is achieved over and over again. This is an attractive result. It suggests that the non-
repeated legislative bargaining game, and the results that come out of such models, do not unravel
10Of course, the most-equitable division results when the budget is split evenly among all n legislators, not just the
AS and the legislative majority. However, none of the models result in the AS sharing the budget with more than m
other legislators.
14when we allow for repeated interactions. In fact, depending on the specics of the repeated process,
the predictions of the repeated and non-repeated models may be identical.
Expected lifetime utility
The previous section compares the per period allocation in each of the games, showing that systems
of endogenous AS power result in a more-equal division of the budget in each period compared to
the model of exogenous AS power. This section accounts for turnover in AS authority and considers
the expected long-run utility in each game.
From an ex ante perspective, before an AS is selected, all legislators expect a per-period alloca-
tion of 1
n. This is the case in all of the models, and implies that before the game begins, legislators
are indierent between the three models. Once the game begins and the AS and majority coalition
are determined, however, legislators are not indierent between the models. A more interesting
look at expected utility considers expected payos from the perspective of an arbitrary period t,
once the AS and Mt are known.
Proposition 7 considers which model of AS authority is preferred by the sitting AS, current
members of the majority coalition, and other legislators from the beginning of any period. Let
AS, M, and o denote the preference-relation over the three repeated games by the sitting AS,
current majority members, and other legislators, respectively.
Proposition 7 If  is high enough that  vote achieves a low-turnover equilibrium, then
 auto AS  vote AS  rand
 vote M  auto M  rand
 rand o  auto o  vote.
If  is low enough that  vote achieves a high-turnover equilibrium, then
 auto AS  vote AS  rand
 auto M  vote M  rand
 vote o  rand o  auto.
Corollary 8 When legislators care enough about future periods, the majority of legislators prefer
the legislature to vote separately on proposed allocations and AS power (i.e., the majority prefer
 vote).
The AS always prefers  auto to either of the other repeated frameworks, as the model allows an
AS to remain in power indenitely, and her cost of doing so is less than in  vote. The majority of
legislators, on the other hand, are indierent between  auto, where they are included in the majority
coalition indenitely, and  rand, where a new AS and majority coalition are randomly selected each
period. This is because the majority coalition is given just enough in the rst endogenous model
to make them indierent between accepting and rejecting the proposal. When legislators are
15suciently patient (i.e., large enough ), the majority of legislators strictly prefer playing  vote,
where members of the majority coalition have more bargaining power in their interaction with the
AS, than in either of the other games. Other legislators, who are not the AS nor members of the
majority coalition, prefer any game that results in the turnover of AS power between periods. Of
course, their preferences change once they become the AS or a member of M in a future period.
4.5 Alternative Assumptions
Assumptions A 1 and A 2 add structure to an AS's choice of Mt. Furthermore, we assume that all
legislators share the same probability of being selected as an agenda setter in any period. Here, we
discuss alternative assumptions.
The rst assumption, A 1, requires that a new majority coalition is made up of randomly selected
legislators. Alternatively, we could allow the AS to strategically select the majority coalition, given
the past votes cast by legislators. In equilibrium, a rational AS believes that a legislator who voted
against an equilibrium allocation a
M in the past will do so again in the future, and will not include
such a legislator in her own majority coalition. This changes the equilibrium allocation in each of
the models.
In the non-repeated framework, for example, voting in favor of the equilibrium budget allocation
earns a majority member aM. If a majority member votes against the proposal, he sends the game
into another period of bargaining in which he has a 1=n chance of being selected as AS. If he
is not selected as AS, he will never be included in a new majority coalition as the new AS will
recognize that he voted against receiving aM in the previous period. Therefore, voting against the
equilibrium allocation earns a majority member expected payo  1
n(1   maM). In equilibrium,
a
M =  1
n(1 ma
M); that is, a
M = 
n+m. This alternative rule about majority coalition formation
takes some of the bargaining power away from the majority coalition members. The equilibrium
payo for a member of the majority coalition is lower under this alternative rule, compared to
under assumption A 1.
The same is true in the repeated frameworks. Allowing the AS to exclude legislators from the
majority coalition based on their past voting record takes bargaining power away from the other
legislators and allows the AS to capture a larger share of the budget each period.
The second assumption, A 2, requires that an AS who stays in power keeps the same majority
coalition as long as they keep voting in her favor. Alternatively, we can relax this assumption
to allow the AS to include any m legislators in future majority coalitions. Under the alternative
assumption, the equilibria found assumption A 2 will still exist, with the AS choosing to maintain
the same majority coalition and the other legislators voting accordingly. However, there will also
exist other equilibria in which the AS follows a dierent voting rule when determining the majority
coalition. For example, there will exist an equilibrium in which the AS randomly chooses the
majority coalition each period, and the other legislators vote accordingly. The existence of these
other equilibria do not add much to the analysis, as the AS prefers the equilibria found under A 2,
since it is in this equilibrium that the AS is able to maintain majority support at the lowest costs.
16Finally, we assume that each legislator has an equal chance of being selected AS in any period
that a new AS is chosen. The allocation that must be given to buy the support of a legislator is
increasing in the legislator's probability of being selected as AS himself in a future period. If we
alternatively assume that agents dier in their probabilities of being selected AS, then an AS will
build a majority coalition with the m other legislators who require the lowest payments in exchange
for support{that is, those legislators with the lowest probability of being selected AS in a future
period. The main results from our analysis should still cary over in such a setting, although the
allocation details will change.
5 Conclusion
A growing literature considers repeated variants of Baron and Ferejohn (1989)'s legislative bargain-
ing framework. These other papers tend to give little consideration to the rules governing agenda
setting authority. The majority of these articles assume that a new AS is randomly selected each
period, even after the successful passage of a proposal. Others assume that the order that legisla-
tors serve as the AS is xed and common knowledge. In both cases, AS authority is independent
of past success or failure as an AS, which is inconsistent with the realities of the legislative process.
We propose two alternative assumptions about how agenda setting authority can carry over
from one round of bargaining to the next. In both frameworks, a successful AS may be able to
continue on as AS the next period. The two models of endogenous proposal power each have
attractive features. In contrast to the standard assumption about random power, these models
predict low turnover of agenda setting power. Additionally, the models result in more attractive
predictions concerning the AS's ability to extract rent from the legislative process, and the wellbeing
of the legislative majority. Assuming that a successful AS automatically continues on as the AS in
the next period is straightforward to incorporate into the model and solve, and predicts a similar
outcome as in the non-repeated game. Assuming that a successful AS must maintain the support
of a legislative majority to hold onto power is more realistic, and produces the most attractive
results regarding the wellbeing of the legislative majority and limits to the AS's ability to extract
rent from the legislative process.
Except for our assumptions governing agenda setting authority, the article assumes a basic
structure for the bargaining environment. For example, we assume symmetric legislators, and an
exogenous default allocation in the event that a proposal does not pass. These assumptions simplify
the analysis and focuses the results on the rules governing agenda setting power. We discuss the
relaxation of some assumptions in Section 4.5. However, allowing both the status quo and agenda
setter identity to depend on past proposals is beyond the scope of this project, and is reserved for
future work.
176 Appendix
Proof to Lemma 1
In a stationary equilibrium, symmetry implies that all legislators propose the same allocation when
they serve as AS, and the proposal is the same in every period. Also, legislators employ the same
voting strategy in every period, so either the proposed allocation will always pass or it will always
fail. Suppose the equilibrium proposal fails. Then the proposal will fail in all periods, and the
expected utility from voting against a proposal is zero. The expected utility from voting in favor
of a proposal is at least zero. If a favorable vote results in strictly positive expected payos, then
a legislator will deviate from their required strategy. If a favorable vote results in expected utility
of zero, then the player is indierent between voting in favor or against the proposal, and A 3
assures that such a legislator will vote for the proposal. Therefore, players always deviate from the
equilibrium strategy of voting against the proposal; a contradiction. QED
Solving  rand (Proof to Prop. 2)
The stationary equilibrium solution concept allows us to limit our attention to symmetric, station-
ary, pure strategies. This means that in any equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome is the same in
each period of the game. All ASs make the same proposal and that proposal either passes in each
period, or it fails each period. Lemma 1 rules out an equilibrium in which the proposal always fails.
We now evaluate the remaining possibility that a stationary equilibrium exists in which a
proposal passes each period. A description of equilibrium must describe the allocation proposed
by the sitting AS in each period, and the voting rule that other legislators follow when deciding
whether to vote in favor of the proposal. It is straightforward to derive a general form of the voting
rule given subgame perfection and A 3. That is, a legislator must vote against a proposal if and
only if its passage decreases his expected discounted lifetime utility. He votes in favor of a proposed
allocation that provides him at
i if
at
i + vE  vD,
where vE denotes the expected future equilibrium payos starting in the next period, and vD
denotes expected future payos if the legislator deviates from the equilibrium strategy to vote
against the proposal. Remember,  is the discount factor that applies within a round of bargaining,
and    is the discount factor that applies between rounds. Thus, a legislator votes in favor of
any proposal oering him at least
 a = vD   vE,
where the cut value  a fully describes a legislator's equilibrium voting strategy in each period.
The sitting AS in each period t proposes at
M and at
AS. In equilibrium, the AS's proposal
must maximize her expected utility, at
AS +vE, subject to budget and incentive compatibility (IC)
constraints. First, the proposal must satisfy the budget constraint, at
AS +mat
M  1. Second, given
that the proposal passes each period, it must satisfy an IC constraint for at least m other legislators.
18This requires that at
M   a. It is straightforward to show that both constraints bind with equality.
If the budget constraint does not bind, then the AS can increase at
AS while keeping at
M constant.
If the IC does not bind, then the AS can decrease aM in order to increase at
AS. By the same logic,
one can rule out the possibility that the proposal oers a positive allocation to more than m other
legislators. Therefore, in equilibrium at
M =  a = vD   vE for all t. Thus, in each period the AS
chooses at
M and at
AS such that at
AS + mat
M = 1 and at
M =  a.
In the stationary equilibrium, at
M and at
AS are the same across all periods, and can be denoted
simply as aM and aAS. Thus, in equilibrium,
aAS + maM = 1, and (1)
aM =  a = vD   vE. (2)
The variable vE in this model denotes the equilibrium expected utility for any legislator, starting
in any period, before that period's AS is determined. In each period, a legislator has a 1=n chance
of being AS and earning aAS = 1 maM, and a m=n chance of being in the majority coalition and


















Variable vD denotes the expected future payo to a legislator who deviates from the equilibrium

















(1   )n   (   )m
. (4)
Solving the four equations, Eq. 1 - 4, gives the equilibrium solution for the proposed allocation,
which we denote a
M and a
AS. From these, we also nd a closed for solution for  a. Because
a
AS > a
M, the AS strictly prefers to give aM to m others rather than announce a proposal that
does not satisfy the cut rule  a.
In each period of the stationary equilibrium, a legislator votes in favor of any proposal that







the AS proposes a
M =  a and a
AS = 1   m a. Such a proposal passes.
Both existence and uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium follows from the above analysis.
We derive an equilibrium, and rule out other possible equilibria.11
11The analysis above relies heavily on the requirements that equilibrium strategies by stationary, symmetric, and
subgame perfect. Weakening any of these requirements will result in additional equilibria.
19In each period of equilibrium, the majority of legislators are oered just enough to make them
indierent between accepting and rejecting the proposed allocation. In this model, oering them
anything at all is only necessary if the within-round discount factor is greater than the between-
round discount factor. This may or may not be a reasonable assumption, depending on the ap-
plication. If  = , then legislators never have an incentive to vote against a proposal since they
expect the same future payo regardless of their action. If  = , then aM = 0 and aAS = 1. QED
Solving  auto (Proof to Prop. 3)
The rst part of the analysis follows the analysis for  rand. We can rule out an equilibrium in which
proposals fail. In any equilibrium in which proposals pass, a legislator votes in favor of any proposal
that oers him at
i   a = vD   vE, and the AS chooses at
M and at




M =  a. In equilibrium, aM and aAS are independent of t. Eq. 1 and 2 continue to hold n
Model 1; however, the values vD and vE dier from the standard model.
If a member of the majority coalition votes in favor of the period t proposal and the proposal
passes, then he will be included in the majority coalition in period t + 1. This is assured by A 2,





If the legislator deviates from his equilibrium strategy and instead follows a strategy of rejecting
allocations of aM, then he earns expected future utility vD which solves vD = (1=n)(1 maM)=(1 
) + (m=n)vD, or






Solving Eq. 1, 2, 6, and 7 gives the equilibrium solution for the proposed allocation, which we again
denote a
M and a
AS. From these, we also nd a closed for solution for  a. Because a
AS > a
M, the
AS strictly prefers to give aM to m others rather than announce a proposal that does not satisfy
the cut rule  a.
In each period of the stationary equilibrium, a legislator votes in favor of any proposal that





the AS proposes a
M =  a and a
AS = 1   m a. Such a proposal passes.
As was the case in the standard model, both existence and uniqueness of the stationary equi-
librium follows from the above analysis. We derive an equilibrium, and rule out other possible
equilibria. QED
Solving  vote (Proof to Prop. 4)
In the second endogenous model, the legislature rst votes on whether to pass the proposed allo-
cation, then it votes on whether to keep or replace the sitting AS. Section 4.3 establishes that any
20stationary equilibria must be either a high-turnover equilibrium, or a low-turnover equilibrium. In
each period of a high-turnover equilibrium, the legislature rst passes the proposed allocation, then
votes to replace the sitting AS. In each period of a low-turnover equilibrium, the legislature rst
passes the proposed allocation, then votes to replace the sitting AS.
In both high- and low-turnover equilibria, a majority of legislators must prefer to vote in favor
of the proposal. Just as in the earlier models, this requires that a legislative majority prefer for
the proposed allocation to pass, which requires that at
i  vD   vE for a majority of legislators,
where the values vD and vE dier between the high- and low-turnover cases.
Consider rst the possibility of a high-turnover equilibrium. In this case, the game is similar to
 rand, and the values of vE and vD are given by Eq. 3 and 4. This means that in any high-turnover
equilibrium, aM  1
n
 
1 . Additionally, in a high-turnover equilibrium the majority of legislators
must prefer to replace the sitting AS in each period. This requires that aM +vE > aM
1
1 , where
the left hand side is the expected payo from replacing the AS after each period, and the right














The AS chooses aM and aAS to maximize her own expected utility, aAS + vE, subject to Eq. 9




1  to any other aM that
satises the legislator IC constraint. Furthermore, she strictly prefers this aHT
M to any lower value,
since a lower value results in no allocation and a loss of power. Finally, it remains to be showen
that the AS prefers to propose aHT
M to any aM  1
n, which would allow her to hold onto power.
This will be the case when (1   maHT
M ) + vE  (1   m 1
n) 1
1 , where the left hand side represents
the AS's future utility if she holds onto power by oering the minimum allocation to the majority
coalition that allows her to do so. Solving this inequality for  gives the AS IC constraint,
 
(1   )m
n   1   m
. (10)
When Eq. 10 is met, there exists a high-turnover equilibrium, as dened in Prop. 4.
Consider now the possibility of a low-turnover equilibrium, in which the same AS keeps power
each period. In this case, a legislator who votes in favor of a proposal providing him aM expects
to receive aM in future periods. Thus, vE = aM
1
1 . Voting against the proposal results in future











12This expression assumes that an AS who keeps power uses the same majority coalition as in the previous period
(i.e., A 2), and that legislators treat their vote as the deciding vote (i.e., A 3).











In a low-turnover equilibrium, aM must be such that a majority of legislators vote in favor of the
proposed allocation, which requires that aM
1
1   vD. It must also be the case that a majority
of legislators vote in favor of the sitting AS. This requires that aM
1
1   aM + ^ vD, where ^ vD is










(aM + ^ vD).

















Clearly, vD < ^ vD, which means that a majority that votes in favor of the AS will necessarily prefer
to vote for the proposed allocation. This renders the requirement that a majority prefer to pass
the proposal redundant. It is sucient to require that the majority of legislators prefer to keep the





The AS chooses aM and aAS to maximize her own expected utility, aAS + vE, subject to Eq. 10
and the budget constraint. Thus, the AS prefers to propose aLT
M = 1
n to any other aM that satises
the legislator IC constraint. She must also prefer aLT
M to any aM < 1
n. The preferred deviation
would oer the lowest aM such that the majority of legislators will vote in favor of the proposal.
Such an aM solves aM
1
1  = vD; that is, aM = 
n. The AS therefore must prefer proposing
aLT
M = 1
n, which allows her to hold onto power, rather than proposing aM = 
n, which provides a
higher current-period payo but results in her losing power at the end of the period. This is the
case when (1   maLT
M ) 1
1   (1   m 
















Plugging in for aLT
M = 1
n and solving for ~ vD gives
~ vD =
(1   )n + (1   )m + m
(1   )(n   )n
.
AS incentive compatibility therefore simplies to
 
(1   )m
n   1   m
. (12)
When Eq. 12 is met, there exists a low-turnover equilibrium as dened in Prop. 4.
Notice that the right hand side of Eq. 12 is less than in Eq. 10, implying that there are values
22of  for which both high-turnover and low-turnover equilibria exists. The above analysis shows
existence (i.e., at least one of the equilibria always exists), and, when it is the case, uniqueness of
the stationary equilibria (i.e., when either Eq. 12 or Eq. 10, but not both, only one equilibrium
exists). This aspect of the results relies on the assumptions made in the analysis, particularly A
2 and A 3, and on the assumptions implied by the solution concept, particularly symmetry and
stationarity.
Related to this, the careful reader will notice that the above analysis relies on the fact that each
player's potential strategy set is restricted to the set of stationary strategies. This means that if an
AS proposes aM this period, she is expected to continue to propose aM in each period so long as
she holds onto power. Furthermore, a legislator that votes against an oer of aM this period will
vote against similar oers in the future. Limiting the strategy set to the set of stationary strategies
greatly simplies the analysis, but it does not weaken the analysis. This approach allows us to nd
all stationary equilibria, and each of the equilibria will continue to be equilibria when a broader
class of strategies are allowed (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Chapter 13). This is because a player
that wants to play a certain strategy in one period will also want to play the same strategy in all
similar periods in the future. When we consider a player's incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
strategy, because all others are already playing stationary strategies, the player will prefer to deviate
in the same way in all periods{that is, his preferred deviation will also be a symmetric strategy.
QED
Proof to Prop. 5
Follows immediately from a comparison of a
AS and a
M as established by the three models. QED
Proof to Prop. 6
Follows immediately from a comparison of a
AS and a
M from Model 1, with the allocation in the
benchmark equilibrium. QED
Proof to Prop. 7
From the perspective of any period t, UAS denotes the expected lifetime utility for the sitting AS,
UM denotes the expected lifetime utility of any member of Mt, and Uo denotes the expected lifetime
utility for any other i = 2 fAS;Mtg.
For  rand, and for the high-turnover equilibrium of  vote,






























For the low-turnover equilibrium of  vote,








It is straight forward to show that
UAS( voteHT) = UAS( rand)  UAS( voteLH) < UAS( auto)
UM( voteHT) = UM( rand) = UM( auto) < UM( voteLH)
Uo( voteLH) = Uo( auto) < Uo( voteHT) = Uo( rand).
The preference relations stated in the proposition follow immediately from these inequalities. QED
Proof to Cor. 8
When  
(1 )m
n 1 m, the low-turnover equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of  vote. As  ! 1, the
right hand side of this inequality approaches 0. Therefore, for any  > 0, there exists a value of
 < 1 such that the low-turnover equilibrium is unique. The same will be true as  ! 1, as long
as the assumption that    is maintained. Prop. 7 already established that when  vote achieves
a low-turnover equilibrium, the majority of legislators prefers  vote to either of the other models.
QED
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